



Towards a new pensions settlement: the international experience Volumes I & II



April 2018



Across 2 vols. a study of 15 countries...so far





Global pension system design context : Structure


Each system combines three pillars...

Social security pensions

Workplace pensions

Individual pensions

The size of each pillar reflects...



... but not equally.


... making each system unique.



Global pension system design context : Good for whom?

A good system must take into account...

Balancing stakeholder interests ain't easy!




Provider Good or bad for whom? Government

Employer

... and balance appropriately.



Scale matters for effective funds...but not exclusively




Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics.



Chile DC since 1980...

Asset alloc GM12



Largest provider (AFP) by AUM (Dec' 17)		1yr returns (highest risk fund)		Monthly commission on contributions		
Habitat	27.40%	Habitat	19.02%	Habitat	1.27%	
Provida	25.20%	Provida	18.45%	Provida	1.54%	
Cuprum	19.60%	Cuprum	19.11%	Cuprum	1.48%	
Capital	19.30%	Capital	18.92%	Capital	1.44%	
Modelo	5.10%	Modelo	17.94%	Modelo	0.77%	
PlanVital	3.40%	PlanVital	17.74%	PlanVital	0.41%	
	3 370				3.11/0	

Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones (diciembre 2017)

Costs

Shift from PAYG to DC was hard and fast with budget surpluses run to cover initial transition costs

Adequacy

 High pensioner labour market participation rates reflect lower than OECD average replacement rates

Coverage

(As defined by regular contributions) just c.50%

Competition measures

Sealed bid auctions for new member cohorts

At retirement

Annuities or programmed withdrawals on retirement

Design notables

- Mandatory participation (excludes self-employed)
- 10% fixed individual contribution (no employer contribution)
- 5 equity risk graded lifecycle fund choices
- Age-based default allocation
- Few limits on overseas investment but equities capped
- Guaranteed minimum returns



Slide 6

need to check to whom this asset allocation refers' different risk grade funds have different investment restrictions

Gregg McClymont, 13/03/2018

Lessons from Chile II


AFP Auction process


- Providers submit sealed bids for all new participant monies
- Lowest bidder takes all
- Biggest providers not competing since focused on attracting existing participants with larger balances
- Successive tender rounds have increased risks for winning AFPs. Can they sustain this fee level?

Administration fee charged by AFPs that have won tender

	Aug-10	Aug-12	Aug-14	Aug-16			
Fee (% of monthly income)	1.14%	0.77%					
Share of AFP assets at start of tender period	0.0%	0.4%					
Fee (% of monthly income)			0.47%	0.41%			
Share of AFP assets at start of tender period			2.7%	3.1%			
	Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of tender period Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of	Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of tender period Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of	Aug-10 Aug-12 Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of tender period Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of	Aug-10 Aug-12 Aug-14 Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of tender period Fee (% of monthly income) Share of AFP assets at start of			

Administration fee charged by each AFP (% of monthly income) Excludes insurance premia







The 4 stages of global DC system design

- 1. Pension savers as rational actors responding to tax incentivised deferred consumption vehicles
- 2. Mandatory pension saving in efficient markets
- 3. Transparency and education to empower rational decision making
- 4. Government interventions via
- -Defaults
- -Competition *for* the market
- -Charge caps
- -State mandated provider

